Nor were the Boeing 737 Max planes automatically equipped with alerts that warned the flight crew of a discrepancy between the angle of attack sensors, another slide said. There was a roughly 20 degree differential between the two sensors on Flight 610.
In Boeing’s fix to get the plane flying again, the Max will rely on data from both sensors. The warning light will also be standard.
“With the blindfolds that the pilots had on because Boeing didn’t include MCAS in pilot manuals, along with the flood of alerts, conflicting distractions in the cockpit and the now-understood relentless power of the old MCAS, even the most experienced and highly trained pilot would be challenged to recover the aircraft in the seconds required,” said Dennis Tajer, a spokesman for the union that represents American Airlines pilots. “If you design a critical flight safety system that counts solely on unrealistic pilot reaction times and do not take into account pilot human factors, then you’ve designed an system awaiting disaster.”
In their findings, Indonesian investigators also questioned whether the plane’s paperwork was in order, noting that there was a “lack of documentation in the aircraft flight and maintenance log” about the plane’s previous flights. As such, the last flight crew was not fully aware of the earlier problems.
Lion Air has been censured in the past for sloppy maintenance and record-keeping.
“Plane crashes are multifactor, never a single factor,” said Soerjanto Tjahjono, the head of the Indonesian National Transportation Safety Committee, in an interview.