The seemingly radical character of this step explains why it has not been taken already, but, contrary to recent misapprehensions, it would be anything but “unprecedented.” The United States has occasionally made hostile foreign government funds available for various humanitarian and remedial purposes. In 2003, President George W. Bush seized approximately $1.7 billion in Iraqi funds sitting in American banks, allocating the proceeds to aid the Iraqi people and to compensate victims of terrorism. In 2012, Congress made frozen Iranian central bank assets available to settle lawsuits with the families of those who had died in Iranian terror attacks. In 2019, the Trump administration made some frozen Venezuelan central bank assets available to the exiled opposition leader Juan Guaidó. And just this February, the Biden administration began the process of liquidating around $7 billion in assets of the defunct Afghan central bank rather than hand them over to the Taliban, reserving half for Afghan humanitarian efforts and half to satisfy court judgments in suits filed by the relatives of those killed or wounded on 9/11. That move has been controversial, owing mostly to unsettled questions regarding court attachment of assets and allocating claims among dueling plaintiffs, but those questions would fall away if Russian assets were transferred directly to assist humanitarian organizations and the Ukrainian government.
While Congress should certainly consider new legislation refining the tools with which it has armed the executive, Mr. Biden already has ample statutory authority to liquidate Russian assets under a section of the International Emergency Economic Powers Act, enacted in 1977 to clarify the previously overbroad and tangled mess of presidential emergency economic powers. As the Supreme Court affirmed in a landmark case about the Iran hostage crisis, the act gives the president “broad authority” to act in times of national emergency and the power to “nullify, void, prevent or prohibit” any foreign country from “holding” or “exercising any right, power, or privilege” over property in which it has “any interest.” It also authorizes the president to “direct and compel” the “transfer, withdrawal” or “exportation” of such property.
Since the reserves in question are Russian state property — unlike the assets of oligarchs — they are not shielded by the usual protections our legal system affords private property. The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee against government seizure of property “without due process of law” applies only to “persons” — not foreign governments — as the Supreme Court suggested in 1992 and multiple federal courts have since held. Protections against the “taking” of property without “just compensation” likewise apply only to “private property,” a category that clearly excludes Russia’s sovereign reserves, even if they are conveniently parked within the United States and in dollars.
The Russian government would no doubt complain bitterly that liquidating its currency reserves was “thievery,” just as it did with the existing sanctions. But Russia’s continued violation of the most basic principles of international law and human rights — and the Ukrainian people’s dire needs — must count for more than its self-serving rhetoric.
To challenge the seizure and liquidation of its assets, the Russian government would have to look not to the Constitution but to a more obscure body of law which shields governments from liability in certain circumstances: “sovereign immunity.” But that immunity protects foreign assets only from judicial process — not from liquidation by the combined action of Congress and the executive branch. And as a mere creation of Congress, as the Supreme Court emphasized as recently as 2016, such immunity cannot survive a congressional enactment like the International Emergency Economic Powers Act.